MONG the numerous controversies surrounding "money', few are further from resolution than the issue of how money affects the economy. Compounding the controversy is the Fact that the arguments adṽ anced are not divided neatly along so-called monetarist and nonmonetanst lines. but are separated by other criteria.
the controversy is the Fact that the arguments adṽ anced are not divided neatly along so-called monetarist and nonmonetanst lines. but are separated by other criteria.
To be sure, rnonetansts have long taken exception to the intellectual straitjacket of the Keynesian framework which limited the influence of monetary actions to the response of investment to iiflerest rate changes. However, the monetarIst alternatives offered have been far from uniform. Certainly, monetary actions result in the change of more than one relative price -the interest rate and one type of spending -investment. However, substantial disagreement among rnonetansts (as sveii as other economists) persists beyond this point.
There is basic agreement that at less than full emp]oyment, chai~gesin the rate of growth of the money supply affect output and employment before prices, a proposition which may be traced back at least two hundred years (Flume [48}), but this tells nothing about how total spending and its components react to monetary actions, It is necessary to examine the changes in relative prices arid wealth associated with monetary impulses to gail) insight into the moneyspending relalion.
When the existing money stock (however defined) either exceeds or falls short of the quantity demanded, wealih and/ui' relative prices change and this sets off 1)0th substitution and wealth effects, as indicated in the a000mpallyrng diagram) The changes in relative *11w author acknowledges the hdpful comments on earlier drafts of George Kaufman, Thomas Mayer, John Pippenger, Robert Rasehe, Wililam Rawson, C~aik Warburton, and William Yohe. They are blameless for remaining errors.
The 'correct" definition of money and the determinants of money demand and suppiy firnetions are matters closely related to. but beyond the scope of the presetit article. Another hrnitation is that because of the large number of authors surveyed, only the briefest of summaries can be given here, in some cases, this results Ui considerable oversimplification of complex analyses.
Substitution and wealth effeets are treated here as essentially equivalent to substthition and income effects of generallyprices typically involve changes in the rates of return on real capital and financial assets as well as changes in the prices of goods and services. Ways in which changes hi wealth may influence spending include movements in leal cash balances and changes in the market value of equities.
There remains eo~siderab1edisagreement about the relative importance of these factors in the transmission of monetary inpulses. This is not surprising, given the history of the relative price and wealth relations. Keynes, as~veI1as prominent economists who preceded him, was ambiguous on the subject. This article first traces the early development of these two factors and then analyzes more recent work in each area.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Among the better early efforts to explain the money~spendinglinkages were those of Irving Fisher and Knut Wicksell. Writing around the turn of the celltury, they both maintained a short-run view of the transmission process which was dominated by interest rate movements and a long-run view in which the key role was played by changes in real cash balances ( Money Price Level
Fisher and Wicksell
Fisher, like other neoclassical writers, determined that output was at its full-employment level in the long run. In the short (or transitional) run, however, business cycies occurred in Fisher's time, as~vell as in other penods before and shice. Consequently, macroẽ conomic' analysts have continued to attempt exp~a-nations of this phenomenon. Fisher's view of the business cycle depended strongly on "sticky" interest rates.-' accepted price theory. Although monetary-induced changes in relative prices or changes in wealth may genorato both sui,stituUon and wealth effects, the relative price change has often been associated more with substitution effects and the wealth change more with wealth effeets; we will follow that practice.
Sce especially Fisher's Chapter 4, "Disturbance of Equation
and of Purchasing Power During Transition PeiioW, in Fisher [25] . In later years, Fisher [24] associated severe swings of the business cycle with changes in debt activity.
The Monetary Transmission Process
This relative price effect (via interest rates) was set off by an increase in the money stock relative to the quantity of money demanded. The nominal money supply may he assumed to have increased due to a rise in the gold stock~md, consequently, bank reserves. With the additioiml assumption that output and velocity were fixed initially, a rise in the commoditv price level was expected to be associated with the money supply increase. Because Fisher assumed that the commodity pi-ice rise preceded the increase in interest rates, with interest costs being viewed as a significant component of firms' operating costs, the rise in the price kvel produced an increase in firms' profits.
A continued increase in demand deposits (through business investment loan demand) relative to currency i-esulted in yet further ii~creasesin prices and profits. Eventhally. however, excess reserves would run out, the interest rate would become "unstuck" and would rise even faster than commodity prices. With the rise in firms' costs of operation, there would occur a decline in profits arid investment and a sharp inc rease in banki-uptcies. The downward phase of the cycle was reversed when excess reserves again rose and the interest rate had fallen accordingly.
Wicksell's well-known "cumulative proee~s" also captured cyclical movements of the economy largely through interest rate changes. Some initial disturbance, such as an innovation or technological breakthrough would foster an increase in the desire to invest at the prevailing interest rate. The demand for loanable funds wouid then rise as would the "normal" or "natural" rate of interest, the rate "at which the demand for loan capital and the supply of savings exactly agree" (Wickseil [89] , p. 193). If, however, the banking community failed to realize that investment demand had risen, they would maintain the same market rate of interest through increases in the flIOflC~supply which, given the usual classical assumptions, would result in commodity price rises.
Note that at this point the money supply has risen, observed interest rates have been kept iow in relation to the normal rate, and business spending has been the component of aggregate demand which has increased. After some period of time, the banks' reserve position deteriorates and monetary growth is curbed. The market rate of interest rises to the level of the ilatural rate, an action which ]eads to the eliminalion of excess aggregate demand and price level increases.
In the above short-run dynamic analyses, both Fisher and Wicksell relied on the relative price mechanism inherent in a money-interest rates-investment framework. However, in their approach to the determination of Iong~runequilibrium, interest rates and investment were replaced by a treatment of the role of real cash balances.
Fisher's real balance explanatioll began with an assumed doubling of the money supply:
Suppose, for a moment, that a doubling in the currency in circulation should not at once raise prices, but should halve the velocities instead; such a result would evidently upset for each indiv~duaI the adjustment which he had made of cash on hand. Prices being unchanged, he now has double the amount of money and deposits which his convenience had taught him to keep oil hand.
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With the apparent increase in wealth, everyone tries to reduce their cash balances by purchasing goods and services, according to Fisher. Because velocity (V) and output (Q) in the equation of exchange MV = PQ ai-e determined to be fixed in the long run, a doubling of the money supply (M) cannot generate any increased holdings of goods and services, hut must result in a doubling of the price level (P).
Wicksell also saw real balances as the adjusting variable on the return path to restoring long-run equilibritim after the economy had been disturbed by an exogenous shock. Now let us suppose that for some reason or other commodity prices rise while the stock 0 f money remains unchanged, or that the stock of money is diminished while prices remain temporarily unchanged. The cash balances will gradually appear to he too sinai? in relation to the new level of prices . -I therefore seek to enlarge my balance. This can oniv be done neglecting for the present the possibility of borrowing, etc.
thi-cmgh a reduction in my demand for goods and services, or through an increase in the supply of my own commodity ... or through both together. 4
The reduction in demand and/or increase in supply will cause commodity prices to fall until they have reached their equilibrium level. Neither Wicksell nor Fisher mentioned the money-rnterest rates-investment spending channel of monetary influence in their analyses of movements to long-run equilibrium. Both focused on changes in real cash balances without explaining in detail the substitutlim and wealth processes involved. Although their long-run vs. short-run analyses were similar in many respects, Fisher was probably more noted for his long-mn quantity theory views and Wicksell more for his short-run cumulative process. There is the possibility, for the reasons discussed above, that, after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity-preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that~dmost everyone prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so io\v a rate of interest. In this event th 0 monetary ai~thority wcmld have lost effective control over the rate of interest. But whilst this limiting case might become practically important in future, I know of no example of it hitherto. Indeed, owing to the unwillingness of most monetary authorities to deal boldly in debts of long term, there has not been much opportunity for a test. Moreover, if such a situation were to arise, ft would mean that the public authority its&f could borrow through the banking system on an irnlimited scale at a nominal [very low] rate of interest. 5
Keynes
Note that after raising the possibility that a "liquidity trap" situation could conceivably arise in the future, Keynes immediately disavowed its existdilce under conditions (the low employment, low interest rate peHod of the 1930s) in which Keynesian analysis suggesteci it would likely occur.
Regarding the second part of the money-interest rates-investment channel, there is considerable evidence that Keynes thought investment to be quite responsive to inteiest rate changes (Leijonhufvud [53] , pp. 157-185) However, the interest sensifivity of investment was restricted in the main to long-term rates, which changed only siowiy.
There are a number of wealth effects to be found in The General Theory which relate to either price-induced changes in wealth (changes in wealth associated with changes in the absolute price level) or interest-inthwed movements in wealth (changes in wealth associated with changes in yields). Of the basic price-induced and interest-induced wealth effects, it has been alleged that "Keynes stated both parts of the wealth effect, emphasized their importance, and then let wealth slip through his fingers by his failure to build it into his analysis." (Pesek and Saving [64] , p. 21). This criticism is unjustified to the extent that those parts of Keynes' analyses which subsequently enjoyed sustained popularity are riot necessarily those parts favored by Keynes. For example, the "liquidity trap" was not an intrinsic part of Keynes' analysis (he denied its occurrence); yet it became closely associated with his name as one of his major contnbutions.
It is easy to see how Keynes' wealth effects were overlooked by those analysts quick to interpret and popularize his basic theory, Keynes brought up the price-induced wealth effect and minimized its significance in the same passage: "It is, therefore, on the effect of a falling wage-and price-level on the der nand for money that those who believe in the selfadjusting quality of the economic system must rest the weight of their argument; though I am not aware that they have done so. If the quantity of money is itself a function of the wage-and price-level [a variant of the real bills doctrine], there is indeed, nothing to hope ill this direction," 6
Keynes endorsed interest-induced wealth effects more vigorously, but made it clear that even these were of secondary importance. As a man well acquainted with the stock market and windfall gains and losses, he thought interest-induced "windfall effects" had only a minor influence on spending habits.
For if a man is enjoying a windfall increment in the value of his capital, it is natura] that his motives towards curreiit spending should he strengthened, even though in terms of income his capital is worth no more than before; . . -Apart from this, the mail' conclusion suggested by experiern~eis, J think, that the short-period influence oi the rate of interest is secondary and relatively unimportant, except, perhaps, where unusually large changes are in question. 7
There is, however, sufflejeilt question about Keynes' view of wealth effects, which appear frequenfly in The General Theory, to spark a continuing debate. [53] .
portance of the two major channels of monetary influence, Keynes in effect was inviting his interpreters to close off the channels completely.
THE RELATIVE PRICE RELATION
The most frequently cited of the relative price relations, money-interest rates1nvestrnent, obviously consists of a money-interest rates channel and an interest rates-investment channel, Closure of either of these channels would eliminate a basic route through which molley is presumed to affect spending. This route was virtually sealed off by early interpreters of Keynes (among others) and not re-opened for about a quarter of a centuiy.
Closet! and Re~Openod
The initial part of the money-interest rates-investment channel was attacked indirectly through innuendo rather than directly either by overpowering theory or evidence. Although Keynes repeatedly stressed the importance of the money-interest rates linkage, J. R. Hicks, the chief architect of the IS-LM "Keynesian" framework, failed to pass along Keynes' emphasis. In Flicks' [44] relatively brief arlicle which became the most popular condensed version of Keynes, Flicks focused on the liquidity trap as one of Keynes' major contributions upsetfing neoclassical theory. Nowhere did he indicate that Keynes was unaware of any such situation actually having occurred. The adoption of such slogans as "yo~i can't push on a string," or "you can lead a horse to water, but you cailt make him dñnk" provided popular support for Hicks' interpretation of Keynes' view of the moneyinterest rates ehaimel in periods of economic slack.
Empirical studies of the late 1930s were the main instrument employed to seal off the interest ratesinvestment channel. Researchers in England and the United States published results of surveys in which businessmen were questioned about the importance of the interest rate in their investment decisions. 0 Ã 'ast majority indicated that interest rates had little or no effect on their decisions to invest. These studies were cited prominently by Alvin Hansen [39] in his 1938 American Economic Association presidential address as evidence of the impotence of monetary policy. Moreover, as Samuelson recently noted, ". . pea-pie like Sir John Hicks said that as far as short-term investme~il is concerned, interest is of no consequence as a cost; and as far as long-term investment is concerned, uncertainty is so great that it completely swamps interest, which leaves you with oniy a minisonic of intermediate investment that is interest e1astic,"~°T he eventual re-birth of the relative price channel did mt occur until well into the 195Os, although the seeds were planted kng before. The emergence of portfolio choice models in the 1950s and 1960s ushered in, among other channels, the old money-interest rates4nvestrnent route.
Much of the literature dealing with portfolio choice models has been associated with money demand studies, Portfolio choice theory, however, provides the rationale for the holding of any asset in one's portfolio, including molley. Instead of focusillg on the individual's or finn's income statement which deals with flows, portfolio choice analysis stresses the stock relationships which are found on the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet. The basic assumptions are that: (1) other things equal, everyone eqintes the marginal rate of return on each asset hi the portfolioallowing for risk (in terms of variaiice of return and exclusive of price level movements), costs of acquiring information and of conducting transactions; and (2) an increase in the supply of any asset (on a macro level) will lower the price of that asset relative to all others. The increased supply of the asset leads to diminishing marginal returns per unit of the asset, thereby motivating the wealth holder to attempt to substitute or exchange some of the asset whose price has fallen for some of those whose price has not.
Changes in relative prices are a consequence of wealth holders' efforts to restore equilibrium to their portfolio -that is, equate all marginal rates of return. The initial disturbance, a change in the stock of any asset, may produce a chain of substitution effects as wealth holders react to changing asset yields.
Although certain types of money have a zero nominal rate of retnrn by law, money continues to be held in the portfolio for at least two reasons. First, as opposed to equities, for example (which may carry substantial risk along with a relatively high mean rate of return), money holding is less risky. Second, money economizes on the use of real resources in the gathering of information and in the conduct of transactions. An implication of this latter characteristic is that°S
money is held to bridge the gap between income receipts arni expenditures." Which assets, besides money, are included in the portfolio? Much of the controversy surrounding the portfolio choice framework has centered on the answer to this question. The early portfolio choice models greatly limited the range of assets and rates of rethrn. Pigou [65] sketched a rough money-capita] model, while Keynes [51] added government and private debt to the menu. By assuming perfect substitutability between capital and boilds, Keynes had only the yield differential between money and one other asset (he chose bonds) to explain. Patinkin's model [63] was similar to Keynes' in terms of assets included and yields explained.
A major change in the approach to the number of assets~mdyields to he examined occurred in the early 1960s. Tohin [77] , Brunner and Meltzer [9] , and
Friedman [28] all expanded the portfolio menu, but in varying degrees)
2 The differing approaches of these contemporary monetary economists~vi11be examined ill some detail.
Three Views on the Relative Price Relation
Tobin ([77], p. 36) suggested that "a minimal program for a theory of the capital account" should include six assets -all of which, except the capital stock, are financial assets -and six yields. The number of assets is only slightly greater than the earlier models, but a substantial step toward reality is taken with the elimination of Keynes' perfect substitutability assumption. The choice of assets is closely restricted to facilitate "purchasing definiteness iii results at the risk of errors of aggregation" (Tobin [77] , p. 28), If increases in the money supply happen to reduce the supply price of capital -the rate which wealth holders require in order to hold in their portfolios the current capital stock below its marginal productivity, the capital stock will rise, This is the sole linkage The types of real capital which are affected by portfolio shuffling are delineated closely by BrunnerMeltzer [9] , although the number of assets and relevant yields in the macro portfolio 'are not. They classify three types of capital according to the relation between asset prices and output prices -language somewhat comparable with Tobin's supply price of capital and marginal productiv~ty.
14 Increases in real capital occur as (not "if") a rise in the stock of base money lowers the relative price of base money ai~dthat of its close substitutes, resulting in an increasec1 demand for other assets, those assets being dominated by real capital. "The increase in the price of financial assets simuitanernisly raises real capital's market value relative to the capital stock's replacement costs and increases the desired stock relative to the actual stock." (Brunner [5] Friedman [28] , in his portfolio choice-relative price analysis, is less formal than either Tobin or BrunuerMeltzer in that he attempts no classification of types of real capital, portfolio assets, or relevant yields. Friedman acknowledges that an increase in the money supply affects the portfolio of the financial sector first, bift the subsequent increase in demand may be as likely reflected next in consumer nond~ira-bles as in any areas of real capital. Possible scenarios are outlined by Friedman in several places.
16 Initially, the prices of sources are raised relaUve to the prices of services, thereby inducing investment and consumer expenditures.
The key feature of this process is that it tends to raise the prices of sources of both producer and consumer services relative to the prices of the services themselves; for example, to raise the prices of houses relative to the rents of dwelling units, or the cost of purchasing a car relative to the cost of renting one. It therefore encourages the production of such smtrees (this is the stimulus to liwesUnent' conceived broadly as inch cling a nmch wider range of items than are ordinarIly included in that teim) and, at the same time, the direct acquisition of services rather than of the source (this is the stimuli's to consumption relative to savings ) But these reactions in their u nil tend to raise the prices of services relative to the prices of soijrces, that is, to undo the initial eflects on interest rates [broadly defined]. The final result may he a rise in expendit ures in all directions without any char~gein interest at all. ' 7
A Comparison of Three Views
The Friedman, Tobin, and Brunner-Meltzer views of the monetary substitution effect are distinguished by a number of points of agreement and disagreement. The three views are coincident in the following: (1) the total response of the financial sector to a change in the money supply occurs before the total response of the real sector; (2) money as a medium of exchange is of less significance than money as an asset with regard to the portfolio choice transmission mechanism; (3) changes in rates of return or yields on real or financial assets are the key e1emei~tsin the transmission process.
To a large extent, the differences in the three views are due not so much to contradictory theories, but°F [34] . Other attempts at pinothg down the open market purchase-bank reserves-interest rates, etc., channels can be found in Cagan [13] rather shades of emphasis among similar approaches. Because Tobin insists on a formal separation of the capital account (stocks) from the production and inc ome account (flows), he is led to highlight different aspects of the portfolio choice process than Friedman and Brunner-Meltzer. 18 Tobin gives the impression that portfolio choice analysis adds little to the Keynesian (not Keynes') view of money-interest rates-investment. Given a consumption function dependent on income, but not wealth or relative prices, consumption can be affected by monetary actions only after investment via the standard Keynesian multiplier. In his portfolio choice analysis, the potential end result of the shu~ingof portfolios is a change in real capital; 10 feedback effects from the real to the financial sector do not fit into Tobin's capital account approach. Tobin specifically draws attention to the insignificance of money's medium of exchange property vis a vis its zero nominal rate of return in his portfolio analysis and generally denigrates money's "uniqueness". Changes in money may set off a chain of portfolio reverberations which results in a change in desired real capital, or it may not.
Friedman's avoidance of formal, structural models which specify any unique monetary transmission process has probably contributed significantly to the charge that monetarists' views of how money works are locked in a "black box". 2°F riedman's informal tracing of possible monetary channels,~stresses the point that consumer spending is as likely to be the real sector component first to respond to monetary acions as is investment spending, Although changes in yields are the key to portfolio adjustments, "These effects can be described as operaling on 'interest rates,' if a more cosmopolitan interpretation of 'interest rates' is adopted than the usual one which refers to a small range of marketable securities" (Friedman [28] , p. 462).
Brunner-Meltzer tread a path between Tobin and Friedman in their methodological approach to port-18 "Treatment of the capital account separately from the proS ductioi~arid income account of the economy is only a first step, a simplification to be justified by convenience rather than realism" (Tobin [811, p. 15 ). It appears, however, that Tobin's efforts at moving toward greater realism (Tobin ) are h~hibitedby the "General Equilibrium Approach" (Tobin [81] [10] dwell on the medium of exchange property of money, but this property does not appear specifically in their formal model [12] of the transmission mechanism. Relative prices in the 1972 model take the form of asset (illeluding securities) prices and output prices, but no distinction is made between investment and consumer goods prices. Finally, in spite of their criticism of IS-LM models which reflect a "Keynesian" approach to the transmission mechanism, they grant that if changes in the stock of government debt were presumed to have no effect on wealth, "our model could be pressed into the standard, ISWM framework" (Brunner-Meltzer [11] , p. 953).
In summation, these three approaches to tracing monetary inipulses are probably not as different as they at first appear. Once the semantic issues are put aside and the preferences for formal vs. informal models are understood, the Tobin, Brunner-Meltzer, Friedman approaches to the relative price channels of monetary influence are quite similar. It remains to be resolved, however, if more is to be gained by Tobin's admittedly heroic abstractions from reality, Friedman's apparent presumption that the channels are too complex to be captured in any economic 2lflrunner [8] , p. 27. FIe adds that "The general role of interest rates does not distinguish therefore between the Keynesian and non-Keynesian posiUons. The crucial difference occurs in the range of the interest rates recognized to operate in the proeess. The Keynesian position restricts this range to a narrow class of financial assets, whereas the relative price theory inckdes interest rates over the whole spectrum of assets and liabilities occurring in balance-sheets of households and firms" (Briinner [8] , p. 27).
model, or Brunner~Me1tzer'sapproach somewhere between these two in terms of answering the q~eslions of the academic fraternity and the general public of how money works.
Other Developments in the Relative Price Relation
Two extensions of the relative price relation which, although out of the mainstream of monetary transmission research, merit elaboration are (1) credit rationing and (2) the overshoot, or feedback, phenomenon. The former involves the allocation of resources by price and nonprice criteria, and the latter is a consequence of the dynamic adjus&nent of the economy to a monetary shock.
Credit Rationing -So long as the price mechanism functions in an open market with complete factor and product homogeneity, resources (including credit) are rationed by price. In so-called "imperfect" markets, however, non-price discriminatory practices abound. Among borrowers who are the same in every respect b~~t one, net worth for example, lenders may advance one borrower credit at an X percent rate and another borrower zero credit at any interest rate. At least, that is one implication of the term "credit rationing". As used here, "global" credit rationing is defined to indicate a reduction in (the rate of) total spending due to a rise in the non-observed interest price of loans.
Traditionally, "local" credit rationing has been associated with the behavior of commercial banks in extending loans in a period of "tight credit". Arguments for commercial bank credit rationing were advanced in 1951 by Robert Roosa [68] . He asserted that in periods of falling security prices (rising interest rates), bankers prefer to pass over relatively more lucrative commercial loans and continue to hold on to their securities in order to avoid a recorded capital loss. Moreover, Roosa contended that banks preferred to hold securities as a means of countering the uncert ainty fostered by the monetary authorities during critical, high-interest rate periods.
Paul Sarnuelson [69] objected to this analysis on the grounds that it did not conform to the usual tenets of profit-maximizing behavior of the flu-rn. He argued that the ustrnl way of rafioning anything in "short supply" was to allow a higher price to do the rationing. Samuelson would not agree that over any other than a very brief period, bankers would hold their assets in relatively low-yielding securities, while rationing a set volume of loans at a fixed interest rate.
Subsequently, additional arguments were employed to buttress the credit rationing view.
22 One of these was that default risk increased relatively more for loans than for securities in tight credit periods. Another was that the banking industry is oligopolistic and is better off to restrict the volume of loans rather than lend out to the point required by the compe~-tive market solution.
Legal interest ceilings have been invoked more recently ii~explanations of the working of credit rationing. The basic idea is that a financial institution might be perfectly willing to lend to a borrower at X percent in accord with such cdteria as size of loan, default risk, and compensating balance requirements, but if usury or other laws set a ceiling at Y percent which happens to be below X percent, the prospective borrower will not obtain the loan. Tie may be able to obtain fimds from some other source, such as from a lending facility in a state whose ceiling is higher, or from an effectively iinregulated private individual. There are, however, considerable costs of information involved in addition to the higher interest costs which may cause the potential borrower to drop out (that is, he rationed out) of the funds market.
Interest ceilings also affect the flows of funds into financial and i~onfinancia1 iflstituth)ns, When market interest rates rise above rates payable (considering lipñdity, nsk, maturity, and tax factors) by savings institutions and state and local governments, many' savers put their funds into less regulated securilies unirkets. The bypassed institutions accordh~g1y cut back their lending activities. Whether the re-channeling of credit results in a reduction of total spending, however, is another matter -one which is rarely treated in the credit rationing literature.
One study, for example, found that Regulation Q ceilings encouraged savers to bypass commercial banks in certain tight credit situations, allegedy forcing commercial banks to curtail credit extensions. 23
Since bank credit is only one component of total credit, it cannot be assumed that a reduction in total credit or total spending could be attributed to the workings of Regulation Q. According to the authors of the study, the reduction of credit available to commercial bank customers "would presumably occur to the benefit of customers of other intermediaries Lindbeck [55] , Hodgrnari [47] , and Kane [50] are among those who have substaitially advanced the credit rationing literature.
2~F edera1Reserve Regulation Q places a eeiling on interest rates payable by member banks on time and savings accounts.
and/or of those firms uble to raise funds directly in the rnarket."24
If it is presumed that credit rationing at one institution is not offset by increased loan activity eIsew here, then "global" credit rationing, which is accompanied by a slowiiig in the rate of total spending, occurs. Because all observed interest rates do not necessarily capture a i-ise in the relative price of credit as represented by greater information and transactions costs (which are assumed to include such costs as increased compensating balances), interest rate changes alone would not give a complete picture of the effectiveness of monetary actions. In certain tight credit situations, interest rates rise to slow down spending. But after some point at which interest yields are confronted by legal rate ceilings, interest rates would not give a correct pictme of the true cost of credit. An important implication of this analysis is that interest rates likely emit inconsistent signals with respect to monetary influences on spending via relative price changes.
Overshoot Effect -The "overshoot effect" is analogous to the previously-mentioned feedback effect, in which the real sector reacts hack upoH the financial sector, with the onginal disturbance having come from the financial sector. Although the overshoot may occur by way of relative price or wealth influences, the vast majority of the hteratllre on this topic is couched in a relative price framework. The term "overshoot" is indicative of the tendency of the initial adjustment of such economic vanables as interest rates and income to exceed the steady-state kvels. Friedman is often identified as the current leading advocate of this thesis, hut the argument has its roots in studies by Fisher, Wicksell, Keynes, and Tooke. 25
Friedman [28], [29] , [33~pointed otit in several places that changes in the money supply and interest rates are inversely related for oniy a short period. A rise in the money supply, for example, is associated with a fall in interest rates initially. After some period of time, the fall in interest rates will have slimulated spending and the demand for credit. The rise in the demand for credit will tend to reverse the initial fall in interest rates. If spending is continually stimulated, demand pressures will force up the price level and price anticipations which, in t~irn,add upward press~resto interest yields.
The extent to which interest rates overshoot their equilibrium value is dependent on many factors, including initial conditions and the duration and degree of monetary stimulus. It should be noted that the rise in the price level lowers the real value of monetary assets. At the higher price level, the quantity of money demanded is less in real terms. Also, the rate of increase of the money supply tends to slow automatically due to "feedback effects through the monetary mechanism" (Friedman and Schwartz [34] , p. 562). Thus, prices, interest rates, money, and general economic activity are all subject to the overshoot phenomenon.
Similar dynamic analysis has been offered by Brunner-Meltzer. Through changes in wealth and relath'e prices, they postulate that monetary impulses alter the magnitude of and rate of return on the capital stock. "Variations in the stock of real capital, of income expected from human wealth, or the yield expected from real capital affect the allocation pattern of financial assets, trigger the interest rnechathsm, and generate a feedback to the asset prices of real capital." Thus, monetary impulses not oniy affect the real processes b~treal impulses feed back to financial processes." 26 Brunner also noted the role of price anlicipations in the feedback process and postulated that without continuing morley growth acceTeration, initial output and employment gains would be offset over lime. 27
Tobin's basic comparative static framework revealed no role for the overshoot effect. On at least two occasions (Tobin [82] , [84] ), however, lie engaged in dynamic analysis. On both occasions he pointed out that initial disturbances in the real sector which affect the money supply (endogenity of money) are a plausible explanation of observed money-income relationships. in one instance ( Tobin and Brainard [84] , p. 119), lie noted that an exogenous change in bank reserves would produce an adjustment path of the yield on real capital which overshoots and oscillates. 20 Brunner-Meltzer [9] , p. 379. Even the standard IS-LM framework can be altered so as to give interest rate and income overshoots.
28 It can be shown that differences in the adj~istmentpattern of investment to interest rates and money demand to interest rates are capable of producing interest rate and income overshoots. If investment is dependent at all on the current interest rate, a sharp drop in interest rates can cause investment to expand and income to rise; if money demand is a function of income, there ensues a rise in money clemand which reacts hack on interest rates.
It is possible to conjecture fairly complicated reaction patterns to relative price changes, even without such complications as an accelerator effect, or changes in the absolute price level. Even working within a simple analytical framework, it would be difficult for policymakers to attempt to stahiTize incomes or interest rates if they did not know whether the adjustment paths were monotonic or cyclical. Considerable empirical verification of the overshoot or cyclical process in the "real" economy has been provided. 29
THE WEALTH RELATION
The monetary channel of influence which operates through changes in wealth is best approached by examii~ation of the linkages between wealth and consumption. Although the substitution effect, in some versions, is seen to work through consumer spending as well as investment, the wealth effect has been typically limited to the consumer sector. The human wealth concept forms the typical Keynesian element in the consumption function. The idalion between nonhuman wealth (divided by the price level), and consumption is probably less well accepted.
Because the arguments for the D and 9 elements of the wealth effect are closely intertwined, they will he discussed together as "Real Balance Effects". The PlC section follows under the heading "Equity Effects".
Real Balance Effects
As mentioned earlier, Keynes discussed several different real balance effects, but made little use of them in his general framework. Ironically, it was the work of a prornindilt Ke3mesian interpreter which sparked renewed interest in real cash balances. Pigou, who generally receives the lion's share of the credit for reviving real cash balances, 3°w as disturbed by Alvin
Hansen's stagnation thesis.
Flansen [40] charged that even with flexible prices and wages, a perpetual state of less than full employment could we]! be the natural resting place for the economy. Such neoclassical economists as Pigou were willing to concede that an assumption of inflexible prices and wages could be consistent with the thesis of a less than full employment state, but only given this important assumption. Pigon demonstrated that the rise in real cash balances associated with a falling price level and unchanged money stock would increase consumer spending, reduce saving, and thereby pennit the rate of interest to rise above some assumed "liquidity trap" level.
By associating consumption with real cash balances, Pigou drove a wedge into the small opening left for monetary policy by the Keynesians of the late 1930s. Because consumption comprises a much larger percentage of total spending than business fixed invest- 30 Pigou [66] . See also Haberler [38] aiid Scitovszky [71] .
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where P pflce of real capital K stock of capital ( EK~-market value of equity) D monetary base p1~sfraction of bank debt not counted in PK Grit government debt (one dollar multiplied by the number of securities outstanding, each of which is assumed to be a consol)
= market interest rate market value of outstanding debt), ment, the potential for monetary policy to affect total spending was greatly expanded. Pigou and others who fonnulated real cash balance theories in the early 1940s did not claim much empirical significance for this effect. Their c(JncCrll was only to show that it was theoretically plausible for the economy to return to full emp1oymet~t under the assumption of price and wage flexibility. They did not take up Keynes' windfall effect or any other aspect of the monetary wealth effect. Thus, their concern was limited to the "D" portion of the nonhuman wealth definition, with the relevant debt typically taken to he the governments demand debt (or monetary base). Don Patinkin took up the discussion of real cash balances in the post-war period 31 He also ignored the hflerest-induced wealth effects and focused on theoretical rather than empirical considerations. Patinkin's chief contribution to the chani~e1sof influence controversy was to spell o~it the hiterplay between the positive real cash balance effect and the negative real cash balance effect which combine to produce proportionality between money and prices (the "quantity theory>') between periods of short-run equilibrium 32
Prominent among those disputing the usefulness of the real cash balance approach have been Flicks and Hansen, who also downgraded the monetary relative price channel. 1-Tansen's [41] criticism of the real balance effect was limited to a short note in which he agreed that the effect could theoretically bring a halt to a downturn. but could not generate the spending required to attain full employment.
Hicks devoted more effort to wealth considerations, as demonstrated by the important role of wealth in his landmark book, Value and Capital [45] . However, neither in Value and Capital nor subsequently did he attach much significance to a monetary weallh effect, Page 18 tary infimmee, so long as no liquidity frap exists, was through his portfolio choice-relative price route.
Exactly what should he included in the "D" portion of the real balance wealth definition has been the subject of debate in more recent years. In most cases, private debt typically is assumed to cancel out. I-lowever, Pesek and Saving [64] maintained that because no interest is paid for demand deposits, wealth (which accrues to hank stockholders) increases in proportion to demand deposits. Thus, they would count both inside money (demand deposits) and outside money (monetary base) in net private wealth, contrary to the traditional view which counts only outside money. To include all inside money as wealth, however, would likely result in some double counling.
If the inside money benefits to banks are capitalized in the value of the banks' stock, as are the typical gains to nonbai~kfirms, the same inside money would he found in the "D" portion and the "PlC" portion of the wealth equation. To the extent that demand deposit gains are not capitalized instantaneously, there should be some allowance made for the addifion of inside money to net wealth, The effect on spending would be through additional outlays by bank stockholders.
What about government securities (G) held by the p~ibIic?Do these represent private wealth? They only represent private wealth to the extent that the public does not anticipate offsettmg future tax increases to eliminate such debt. The term in the wealth equation may have some effect on spending thro~igh: (1) changes in the magnitude of G; (2) changes in the composition of C; and (3) changes in r.
One source of controversy concerning changes in wealth has been the relation between G and D. The two have frequently been summed (interest-bearing debt plus non-interest hearing debt) in empirical and theoretical investigations of the effects of "liquidity" on the economy. If it can be assumed that C and D are good substitutes, their composition is of less conWhile this did not lead him to reconsider also the assmuiption that the wealth effects of interest changes cancel, it may \veil be that the same remark applies also to this problem." (Leijonhiifvud [53] , p. 275).
Hicks eventually took note of the real cash balance version of the wealth effect in a review of the first edifion of Patinkin's book. Hicks missed the point initially that a rise in real cash balances stimulates spending, as he later admitted in his Critical Essays ( [46] , p. 52). In 1967 he recognized the existence of a 'liquidity pressure effect' -but thought it had merit only in restraining an expanding economy. This concept, of course, is a variation on the monetary policy 'can't push on a string" thesis.
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cern than their sum.
3 Early empirical investigations of wealth effects pllblished shortly after the accumiña-tion of much government debt in World \Var II often tested the real balance effect as the sum of G and Many found a strong relation between liquid wealth and consumption. If this can be called a direct channel, a more indirect route, via interest rates. has been envisioned by others.
lobin [79] emphasized aggregate monetary wealth and its compositnm with respect to the effect on interest rates. Not oniy does an increase in monetary wealth relative to real assets lower the supply price of capital and thereby induce investh~ent, but an increase in short-term government debt relathe to longtei-m debt (110 change in aggregate deht) may achieve the same result. These actions are closer to fiscal poiicy or debt management policy than to what is normally labeled monetary pohey.
To the extent that monetary actions affect the yields on government debt, there is~~~n interest-inì-duced monetary wealth effect on consumption. If expansive monetary actions lower the "r" component of proportionateIy more than "G" in the wealth definition, nonhuman money wealth rises, as does (under typical assumptions) consumption. Of course, a monetary overshoot effect would reverse the fall in interest rates and subseqiwntly~vork in the opposite direction on consumer expenditures. Also, if the rise in the price of securities (fall in interest rates), induces those wealth holders who have not yet purchased securities to pay a higher price for their securities, this particu~-lar group may curtail their outlays for consumer goods. 36
HProponents of the "New View" also add non-government, non-bank liabilities, such as savings and loan shares, to the total. See Brunner [6] . As far as the real-balance effect, especially that part which pertains to "D" is concerned, there is little indication that Tobin Brunller-Meltzer, or Friedman envision monetary influences as having much impact through this channel.
37 In at least two cases, however, these leading monetary economists have found a strong role for the money-equity channel. Their views on the money-equity route will be discussed after mention of some of the earlier proponents of this channel.
.Equity Effect
How can monetary actions affect the market value of equity, "PK"? One aUS\VCr was provided by Lloyd Metzler, who re-opened the equity channel in 1951 which had been described earlier by Keynes. Metzler [58] was probably the first economist whose formal model inclilded the investment-borrowing costs thannel and both aspects of the wealth channel -real cash balances and private equities 38 Metzler, however, made the unusual assumption that the Federal Reserve increases the money stock through purchases of privately held common stock.
An increase in the money stock (in the Metzler model), given full employment, results in a proportional increase in prices and this no change in consumption with real balances remaining constant. The Federal Reserve's purchase of common stock lowers net private wealth (the volume of securities in private hands falls) and consequently, consumer spendii~g. The fall in consumer expenditures is accompanied by a rise in saving, a fall in the rate of interest, and the conseqi~entincrease ill capital intensity. Criticism of Metzler's model centered on his unusual assumptions, which, among other results, gave a negative association between monetary growth and consumer spending.
The more orthodox conjecture, that monetary growth, the market valuation of equities, and coninversely, related to the author recently that an inverse relalion is more likely in the depression state, such as the 1930s. than today.
37 'Like Friedmari (1970, pp. 206-7) we believe that the rea~-ba1aneeeffect is one of several explanations of long-run chai~gesin the IS curve. We agree, also, that the short-run miportance of the real-balance effect is small &rnugh to neglect in most develcpecl economies where real balances are a small part of wealth. In our analysis the size of the traditional real-balance effect depends on the proportion of money to total nonltuniaii wealth, a factor that is less than .05 for the United States" ( Bronner and Meltzer [11] , p 847).
Tinbergen provi led the first empirical test of an equitiesconsumption relation. Dividing cons~imption into that by income earners and non-workers, he found that "a fall in capital gains had already caused a decline in consumption between 1928 and 1929" (Tinbergen [75] , p. 78).
sumer spending are all positively related, has bed given theoretical and empirical support by Franco Modigliani. Modigliani [59] , [60] The money-equities-consumption channel in the FRB-MIT model hinges on the substitutability of bonds and stocks. If an increase in demand for, say, Treasury securities, by the Federal Reserve results in lower yields and higher prices for these securities, other investors could~vc1Ibe discouraged from purchasing the now higher-priced Treasury securities, but securities whose price was not initially affected by the Federal Reserve action. To the extent that demand is shifted to equities from Treasury securities because of their higher price, there is a rise in common stock prices, which is reflected in a rise in PK.
The higher equity prices represent capital gains to equity owners. The wealth effect portion of this process is the inducement to spend on the part of equity owrn~rsbecause of their increased net worth. Over a sixteen-quarter period, the equity channel represents 45 percent of the enlire monetary influence on total spending in the FRB-MIT model. 4°3 It is not likely that Friedman would credit any sort of monetary-induced nonhuman wealth effect as having that much influence on spending. The relalive price channel dominates his discussion of the channels of monetary influence ir~numerous articles (Friedman [28] , [33] , [34] ). In more recent studies in which Friedman developed a formal economic model, he omitted wealth from the consumption function, using oniy C/p = f(I, r). 41 One indication that nonhuman wealth is of some significance in his view of the transmission process emerged in a recent article in which he attempted to delineate initial and subsequent shifts in the IS-LM apparatus. 42
Until recently, Tobin apparently shared Friedman's lack of enthusiasm for monetary-induced wealth effects on consumption. His omission of wealth influellees on consumption may be found in his informal models of the early 1960s as well as his more detailed models of the late 1960s.
43 It is not so mllch that Tobin denied a wealth effect, rather that he preferred to keep stock and flow variables separate. Thus, consumption (and saving) were functions of flow variables specifically income -and not wealth, a stock concept. "The propensity to consume may depend upon interest rates, hut it does not depend directly on the exisfing mix of asset supplies or on the rates at which these supplies are growing." 41
In a significant departure from most of his previous studies, Tobin [85] stressed the importance of wealth effects in an article co-authored with Dolde in 1971. They considered the "two major recognized channels of monetary influence on consumption: (A) changes in wealth and in interest rates, (B) changes in liquidity constraints."
45 They recognized the historical sig- Bmnner and Meltzer have long included a prominent role for wealth effects in their view of the monetary ti-ansrnission process. "PK" is the component of nonhuman wealth mentioned most favorably in their analysis. For example, in discussing the chain of events following an injection of base money, BrunnerMeltzer noted that "the resulting rise in the market value of the public's (nonhuman) wealth raises the desired stock of capital III and the desired rate of real consumption."
46 They further stated that relative price effects also operate to increase real consumption following the expansive monetary action.
At a later date Brunner again stressed the importance of "PK" relative to the real balance effect in the transmission process. "The dominant portion of the wealth adjustment induced by a monetary impulse occurs beyond a real balance effect and depend.s oit he relative price change of existing real capita]. The monetarist analysis of the trai~smissionmechallism determines that this portion of the total wealth effect thoroughly swamps the real balance or even the financial asset effects," 47
Real balances are included, however, in Brrniner and Meltzer's [12J formal model. Total spending ohe as to why he chose to include wealth in the coflsumpt ion funetjon. Now if it had been true that the incomeHow theory of consumption 'vas a resounding success, and that its indications were being borne out all the time, then we wouldn't need to go into the wealth theory or the lifeeyele theory and all that. We wouldn't need to seek a fundamental theory about why savings ratios are what they are and how they relate to various parameters. But we all know that the cash income theory is not a resounding suecess. " (Pesek and 5av h~geffect) .
Formal economic models now routinely include wealth and/or substitution effects cm consumption. 48 Few, if any, of the ernpiricaIIy-oriei~ted, structural models permit all the wealth effects on consumptiofl described above. For example, the FRE-MIT mode] (Board of Governors [3] ) has an equities effect but no real balance effect; the \Vliarton Mark III model (McCarthy [56] ) has a real balance effect but no equities effect. Only when model builders make allowance for all possible monetary effects are so-called structurally rich models as likely to reflect as sigmficant a rnoney~spending impact as reduced form models. There is, of corn-se, a good possibility that yet undiscovered wealth, relative price, and even monetary income effects will be fotrnd in the monetary charniels of the future.
SUMMARY
This article surveyed the rehthve price and wealth changes set in motion when the quantity of money supplied changes relative to money demanded. Relative price~md wealth changes were viewed as major elements of the molletary transmission mechanism around the turn of the century (in rudimentary fashion) and in recent years, hut in much of the intervening period their role was subjected to considerable question.
Fisher and Wicksell favored one approach in which wealth was the dominant monetary force ai~danother in which relative prices were of more significance. Keynes amplified 1)0th views, but his major interpreters were not SO inclined. AIternative~y, a rise in the money supply may be associated with a change in relative prices and no change in wealth. For example, a fall in currency relative to demand deposits increases the molley supply and lowers bank loan rates, but there is no rise in real balances -if defined oniy as outside money -and no change in Government debt.
Thus, depending on how the money supply is caused to change relative to money demand, sonic effects on spending are set in motion, but not necessarily all. Moreover, the fact that initial conditions, to melude all relative prices, are never the same suggests that under one set of circumstances initial monetary effects may be on, say, conslimer durable goods expendithres, and under another set, state and local government purchases. To follow explicitly the channels of monetary influence whenever there occurs a change in the quantity of money supplied relative to the quantity demanded, one would have to know as a minimum the cause of the change in the money supply, all re1eva~trelative prices, and the impact of other exogenous events on spending units. Add to this the effect of feedback forces, both relalive price and wealth, and it becomes less surprising that the contents of the monetary black box have been difficult to unravel.
The complexity of the forces at work, however, does not mean that one should despair of forecasting the effect of molletary iiilluences on total spending and rely on (presumably) more elementary tools to guide economic activity. 
